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The Public Figure-Private Person





What has become of the first amendment interests supposedly
protected by the United States Supreme Court's landmark libel case,
New York Times v. Sullivan?' In recent years, the National En-
quirer enjoyed a first amendment privilege to tell the world what
Carol Burnett was overheard to have said in a Washington restau-
rant.' Another tabloid enjoyed the same privilege to discuss the min-
ute details of Johnny Carson's love life.3 The press has not enjoyed,
however, a first amendment privilege to report on a police informant
charged with breaking into a defense attorney's office and stealing
documents,4 or the campaign activities of a political advisor to a
United States Senate candidate.'
Why does the first amendment protect press reports of Johnny
Carson's love life but not those relating to a campaign for one of the
nation's highest public offices? Surely, one would expect a nation
with "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" to
value reports of election activities over gossip column tales of celebri-
* Member of the firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler. A.B. 1966, Catholic
University of America; J.D. 1973, Georgetown University; L.L.B. 1975, St. John's College,
Cambridge University. Mr. Branson, libel counsel to syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, re-
cently argued the case of Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, No. 84-1602, before the United States
Supreme Court.
** Associate with the firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler. A.B. 1977,
Stanford University; J.D. 1982, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California.
I. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206
(1983) (overheard statements of Carol Burnett).
3. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
4. Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981).
5. Lawrence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1981).
6. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
ties' dinner conversations. The culprit is the public figure - private
person dichotomy which has been at the center of libel law since the
Supreme Court's 1974 opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.7 While
first amendment interests may have shaped the public figure concept
in the beginning,8 subsequent analysis has lost this focus. It has be-
come little more than a common law "assumption of the risk" test in
which first amendment concerns figure, if at all, only remotely. The
law has strayed from the values which motivated New York Times v.
Sullivan. The issue is no longer whether press protection should be
extended to the "outer limits"9 of the first amendment. Rather, the
issue has become whether the press is entitled to any protection at
all. Justices now call for the revocation of first amendment protec-
tion, and first amendment commentators worry about the limitations
expressed by the Court in last year's Dun & Bradstreet v. Green-
moss Builders, Inc. decision. 10 The changing focus of the text has
torn the fabric of the first amendment and has deprived it of its in-
tellectual validity. To protect precious first amendment rights, the
intellectual integrity of the analysis must be restored.
II. Evolution of the Public Figure - Private Person Dichotomy
A. The Common Law
Prior to New York Times, defamation law was untouched by
first amendment concerns. "[T]he consistent view of the Court was
that libelous words constitute[d] a class of speech wholly unpro-
tected by the First Amendment."" While the early common law en-
compassed many privileges, they were unrelated to the first amend-
ment or any other constitutional analysis. Rather, they were based
on a duty to speak or write. For example, defendants' common law
privileges included talking to a sister about her fianc6; 12 responding
to a request for character references on former employees;13 warning
a creditor about his debtors' insolvency;1 4 or informing a landlord
that a repairman's work was unsatisfactory. 8
7. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
8. See infra notes 29-58 and accompanying text.
9. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 380 U.S. 130, 148 (1967).
10. 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948 (1985) (Burger, J., concurring), id. at 2948-54 (White, J.,
concurring).
11. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (White, J., dissenting).
12. Todd v. Hawkins, 8 C & P. 88 (English Nisi Prius Reports 1837).
13. Carroll v. Owen, 178 Mich. 551, 746 N.W. 168 (1914); Doane v. Grew, 220 Mass.
171, 107 N.E. 620 (1915).
14. Ormsby v. Douglass, 37 N.Y. 477 (1867); Ritchie v. Arnold, 79 III. App. 406
(1898).
15. Toogood v. Spring, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ex. 1834); see also Stuart v. Bell, 2 Q.B.
341 (1891) (host privileged to warn guest about servant suspected of dishonesty). Defendants
were also privileged to defame another while consulting an attorney, Lapetina v. Santangelo,
The common law, in most states, provided a qualified privilege
for "fair comment" on matters of public interest.16 Generally, the
privilege attached to opinions on matters of public concern based
upon facts either disclosed in the publication or otherwise publicly
available. The privilege protected only comments made honestly and
without malice, 17 including comment on qualifications of public offi-
cials,' 8 admission or disbarment or attorneys,' 9 and management of
institutions such as schools.2 0 It also covered criticism of anything
submitted to the public for its review such as books, movies, music
and art.2 In these contexts, however, the privilege did not normally
extend to false statements of fact.
A common law privilege that foreshadowed the public figure
test was frequently referred to as the "public man" or "public fig-
ure" privilege, although its contours varied from state to state.22 In
some jurisdictions, the "public man" concept was merely a subset of
the fair comment privilege. The privilege did not extend to false
statements of fact, even if such statements were honestly believed to
124 A.D. 519, 108 N.Y.S. 975 (1908); to warn employees of plaintiff's improper conduct,
Lawler v. Earle, 87 Mass. 22 (1862); and to protect a business against improper competition,
Powell v. Young, 151 Va. 985, 145 S.E. 731 (1928). Similarly, a company was privileged to
warn its customers about possible fraudulent collections. High v. Harwi Hardware Co., 115
Kan. 400, 223 P. 264 (1924).
16. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 606 (1938); Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publish-
ing Association, 179 N.Y. 144, 154, 71 N.E. 739, 742 (1904).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, comment a (1977).
18. See, e.g., Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U.S. 452 (1911).
19. Kennedy v. Item Co., 197 La. 1050, 3 So.2d 175 (1941); Spriggs v. Cheyenne
Newspapers, 63 Wyo. 416, 182 P.2d 801 (1947).
20. Clark v. McBaine, 299 Mo. 77, 252 S.W. 428 (1923).
21. Dowling v. Livingston, 108 Mich. 321, 66 N.W. 225 (1896) (book); McQuire v.
Western Morning News Co., 2 K.B. 100 (1903) (music); Battersby v. Collier, 34 A.D. 347, 54
N.Y.S. 363 (1898) (art).
22. In almost all jurisdictions, public officials who sued for libel had to face a privilege
of some kind, at least where the alleged defamation related to their official conduct. See, e.g.,
Gandia v. Pettingill, 222 U.S. 452 (1912); Kutchner v. Post Printing Co., 149 P. 552, rehg.
denied, 147 P. 517 (Wyo. 1915); Salinger v. Cowles, 191 N.W. 167 (Iowa 1922); Carver v.
Greason, 177 P. 539 (Kan. 1919); Alexander v. Vann, 104 S.E. 360 (N.C. 1920). In some
states, people who were not public officials, but merely candidates or applicants for public
office, had to meet the same privilege. See, e.g., Ott v. Murphy, 141 N.W. 463 (Iowa 1915);
Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908) (facts and comments about candidates for
reelection were privileged if published in good faith even though matter stated is untrue in fact
and derogatory to the character of the candidates); Dunneback v. Tribune Printing Co., 65
N.W. 583 (Mich. 1895); Belknap v. Ball, 47 N.W. 674 (Mich. 1890); contra Starks v. Comer,
67 So. 440 (Ala. 1914). In a few states, a person who was unrelated to government but in-
volved in a matter of public interest or controversy could be subject to the "public man" test.
See, e.g., Flanagan v. Nicholson Pub. Co., 68 So. 964 (La. 1915) (comment on New Orleans
resident who had opposed city's efforts to secure the Panama Fair); Diener v. Star-Chronicle
Pub. Co., 132 S.W. 1143 (Mo. 1910) (since the killing of a child in a public street by an
automobile was a matter of public interest, publication accusing coroner of joining with police
to let the driver [plaintiff] go free was privileged); Bodwell v. Osgood, 20 Mass. 879 (3 Pick.),
15 Am. Dec. 228 (Mass. 1825); contra Washington Herald Co. v. Berry, 41 App. D.C. 322
(D.C. 1914).
be true.23 In other jurisdictions, however, untrue statements of fact
were protected if they were honestly believed to be true and pub-
lished in good faith;2' at least where such statements were made in
the performance of a public or official duty,25 or did not accuse the
official of committing a crime.26
The courts often described the rationale for this privilege as em-
anating from the press' duty to inform the public.2" It was a populist
notion; in a participatory society, citizens needed information about
the activities of "public persons." The press was often said to have a
social or moral obligation to inform the public, and was encouraged
to do so by a qualified privilege when sued for libel. A second ration-
ale for the "public man" privilege argued that the public man "as-
sumed the risk" that involvement in public life would invite
comment.28
B. The Introduction of the First Amendment
In New York Times v. Sullivan,29 the common law appeared to
give way to the first amendment. The New York Times Court found
Alabama's common law rule "constitutionally deficient for failure to
provide the safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that
are required by the first and fourteenth amendments in a libel action
brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct."30
The tort of libel, the Court held, "must be measured by standards
that satisfy the First Amendment."3 1
In New York Times, and later in Curtis Publishing Co v.
Butts32 and Associated Press v. Walker,3 3 the Court borrowed the
23. See, e.g., Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam, 59 Fed. 530 (6th Cir. 1893); Democrat Pub. Co.
v. Harvey, 205 S.W. 908 (Ky. 1918); Upton v. Hume, 33 P. 810 (Or. 1893).
24. Kutcher v. Post Printing Co., 149 P. 552, rehg. denied, 147 P. 517 (Wyo. 1915);
Carver v. Greason, 177 P. 539 (Kan. 1919); cf., Snively v. Record Pub. Co., 198 P. 1, 4-6
(Cal. 1921) (qualified privilege is not lost under statute protecting communications concerning
acts of a public officer merely because charge complained of is false or because communication
charged public officer with commission of a crime).
25. McAllister v. Detroit Free Press Co., 43 N.W. 431, 437 (Mich. 1889); Irion v.
Knapp, 60 So. 719, 722 (La. 1913).
26. Yager v. Bruce, 93 S.W. 307 (Mo. App. 1906); Forke v. Homann, 39 S.W. 210
(Tex. Civ. App. 1896); see also Bee Pub. Co. v. Shields 94 N.W. 1029, 1031 (Neb. 1903),
rehg. denied, 99 N.W. 822 (1904).
27. See, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennon, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908); cf. Moore v. Booth Pub.
Co., 185 N.W. 780, 781 (Mich. 1921) ("the interests of society require that immunity be
granted to newspapers in the discussion of public questions").
28. Meyers v. Longstaff, 84 N.W. 233, 237 (S.D. 1900) ("When one becomes a candi-
date for public office, he thereby deliberately places his conduct, character and utterances
before the public for their discussion and consideration"); Ott v. Murphey, 141 N.W. 463, 467
(Iowa 1913); Schull v. Hopkins, 127 N.W. 550, 553 (S.D. 1910).
29. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30. Id. at 269.
31. Id.
32. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
33. 389 U.S. 997 (1967).
language of the "public man" privilege, referring first to "public offi-
cials" and later to "public figures." While the Court used the com-
mon law terms, it made clear that it did so for constitutional reasons.
The Court focused upon public officials and public figures precisely
because their activities generally bear upon matters of public
concern.
That the Court cared more about the public interest involved
than the status of the persons discussed is clear from a number of
passages in the Sullivan opinion. For example, the Court noted the
importance of "freedom of expression upon public questions,' '3 4 and
"[t] he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the peo-
ple."'3 5 Praising the "prized American privilege to speak one's mind
. . . on all public institutions,"36 the Court echoed Justice Brandeis'
sentiment that the free speech guarantee gives meaning to the "fun-
damental principle of the American government" that "public dis-
cussion is a political duty. '37 Indeed, the Court spoke of the right to
criticize the government as "the central meaning of the First
Amendment."38 The Court noted that "whatever is added to the field
of libel is taken from the field of free debate." 39 In a frequently
quoted passage, the Court cited the "profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caus-
tic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials."40 As this passage indicates the Court focused on the
importance of the "debate on public issues," not on the status of the
persons. The Court viewed potential verbal attacks on government
and public officials as mere by-products of that important debate.
The Court took the same approach in Curtis Publishing Co. v.
Butts4I and Associated Press v. Walker"2. In Curtis the Court dis-
cussed the importance of "dissemination of information . . . on
questions of public concern, ' 43 and the protection of "such free and
general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential.""
Finding "[t]he dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters




38. Id. at 273.
39. Id. at 272.
40. Id. at 270.
41. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
42. 389 U.S. 997 (1967).
43. 388 U.S. at 150.
44. Id.
of public interest" an "unalienable right,"' 5 the Court declared the
"guarantee of freedom of speech and press" a "social necessity re-
quired for the 'maintenance of our political system and an open soci-
ety.' " 6 Concerning the contested articles in both cases, the Court
specifically noted the public interest in their circulation.47 Thus, the
Court's first amendment concerns with the public's interest in the
stories influenced its treatment not only of public officials,8 but also
of public figures.
The Court's "search for the outer limits" '49 of the first amend-
ment culminated in its 1971 opinion in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.5" A plurality of the Court jettisoned the common law terms,
finding the "simple distinction between 'public' and 'private' individ-
uals or institutions" an "artificiality." '51 The Court focused, instead,
on the first amendment's "function to encourage ventilation of public
issues," 52 which the plurality held as essential to American "[s]elf
governance."5 3 Whether the individual is a public or private figure is
inapposite if the event involves a public interest matter:
[If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is
involved, or because in some sense the individual did not 'volun-
tarily' choose to become involved. The public's primary interest
is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the partici-
pant and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not
the participant's prior anonymity or notoriety.5 '
The Rosenbloom plurality's concern for "the public interest"
went well beyond matters bearing strictly on self-governance: "Free-
dom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this na-
tion, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or
appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exi-
gencies of their period." 55 Indeed, quoting Justice Harlan's opinion
in Curtis Publishing,56 the plurality noted that "[t]he Founders...
felt that a free press would advance 'truth, science, morality, and
arts in general' as well as responsible government.
'57
45. Id. at 149.
46. Id. (citing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967)).
47. Id. at 154.
48. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
49. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 148.
50. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
51. Id. at 41.
52. Id. at 46.
53. Id. at 41.
54. Id. at 43.
55. Id. at 41 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
56. 388 U.S. at 147.
57. Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 42. In a concurring opinion, Justice White would have
Rosenbloom's deficiency quickly became apparent. Where
should the line be drawn between information which is "needed or
appropriate to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period"5 8 and that which is not? If everything "in the public
interest" is to be protected, and if the definition of "public interest"
is not confined to "matters bearing broadly on issues on responsible
government," 59 what, if anything, is left unprotected? As a practical
matter, the test enunciated by the Rosenbloom plurality meant that
if the press thought an event newsworthy enough to write about, it
must be "in the public interest."
C. The Reemergence of Common Law Concepts
The Court addressed these issues in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.60 and found that an analysis of only the public interest ignores
the reputational interests of private individuals involved in the re-
ported event. To protect these interests, the Court returned to the
pre-Rosenbloom distinction between public figures and private indi-
viduals."1 Nevertheless, while returning to the public official-public
figure language of New York Times, Curtis Publishing and Walker,
the Gertz Court no longer emphasized the public interest rationale
underlying those labels. Instead, it focused on the common law "as-
sumption of risk" rationale6 2 under which individuals who "volunta-
rily" enter public controversies, are deemed to have "invit[ed] atten-
tion and comment.63
Gertz's suggestion of the "rare" possibility that one might be-
come an "involuntary" public figure - by becoming unwillingly em-
broiled in a public controversy - seemed an acknowledgment of the
first amendment concern for the "public interest" expressed in New
extended the New York Times standard to private individuals involved in a matter of legiti-
mate public interest only when such individuals are mentioned in the course of a report "upon
the official actions of public servants." Id. at 62. In Justice White's view, "the First Amend-
ment gives the press and the broadcast media a privilege to report and comment upon the
official actions of public servants in full detail, with no requirement that the reputation or the
privacy of an individual involved in or affected by the official action be spared from public
view." Id.
58. Id. at 41.
59. Id. at 42.
60. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
61. Id. at 343.
62. In Gertz, as well as in subsequent cases, the Court pointed to two bases for the
public figure-private individual distinction: (1) "assumption of the risk", and (2) the public
figure's greater access to the media. While both usually merit attention, it is the "assumption
of the risk" concept that carries greater weight. In Gertz, the Court cited the plaintiff's "vol-
untary entry into the controversy" as the "more important" justification for the distinction.
418 U.S. at 344; see also Wolston v. Readers Digest, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 164 (1979). Indeed,
in Gertz the Court explicitly recognized the frequent ineffectiveness of a public figure's pur-
ported access to the media, and acknowledged the consequent limitation of the access-to-media
rationale. 418 U.S. at 344, n.9.
63. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345.
York Times. However, by the time the Court decided Wolston v.
Readers Digest, Inc.," concern for the public interest was barely
perceptible. Noting that Wolston did not " 'voluntarily thrust' or 'in-
ject' himself into the forefront of the public controversy,' 6 5 but
rather was "dragged unwillingly" 66 into it, the Court appeared to
conclude that public-figure status is contingent on voluntary
involvement.6 7
III. Present Contours of the Public Figure Doctrine
The test applied by Gertz and its progeny focuses on assumption
of risk rather than true first amendment concerns. The inquiry no
longer addresses the public interest, even indirectly.' Rather, the in-
64. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
65. Id. at 166.
66. Id.
67. Id. Some courts have continued to employ the involuntary public figure concept,
thereby embracing - wittingly or unwittingly - the public interest underpinnings of New
York Times. For example, in Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1978), the plaintiff, whom defendants had called a "mobster," had been the subject of pub-
lished newspaper and other media reports of his activities, and had associated with various
people who were subjects of widespread media attention. However, he had never sought public
attention and he disputed the accuracy of prior media reports. The court, noting that "the
status of public figures vel non does not depend upon the desires of an individual," id. at 861,
concluded that plaintiff was a public figure. The court's reasoning reveals its concern for the
public's interest in the story:
Comment upon people and activities of legitimate public concern often illumi-
nates that which yearns for shadow. It is no answer to the assertion that one is a
public figure to say, truthfully, that one doesn't choose to be. It is sufficient, as
the district court found, that "Mr. Rosanova voluntarily engaged in a course
that was bound to invite attention and comment."
Id. See also McDowell v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 949-51 (3d Cir. 1985) (architect-engi-
neer on controversial building project was limited-purpose public figure despite his desire to
avoid notoriety).
This focus on the public importance of the story rather than on the status of the individ-
ual was even more apparent in the recent case of Dameron v. Washington Magazine, No. 84-
5082, slip op. (D.C. Cir. December 24, 1985). In Dameron, the district court had held that an
air traffic controller who was on duty at the time of a much-publicized airplane crash was not
a public figure since he had not "injected" himself into the controversy. The Court of Appeals
disagreed:
It is true, as the district court held, that Dameron can not fairly be said to have
"injected" himself into the controversy. This one factor, however, is not the be-
all and end-all of public figure status. Injection is not the only means by which
public-figure status is achieved. Persons can become involved in public contro-
versies and affairs without their consent or will. Air-controller Dameron, who
had the misfortune to have a tragedy occur on his watch, is such a person. We
conclude that Dameron did become an involuntary public figure for the limited
purpose of discussions of the Mt. Weather crash.
It should be noted, however, that even in these involuntary public figure cases, the application
of the actual malice standard is not based solely upon consideration of the public interest
involved. As in other public figure cases, the courts still examine not only whether the matter
is of public importance, but also whether it involves a public controversy. See, e.g., McDowell
v. Paiewonsky, 769 F.2d 942, 948-49 (3d Cir. 1985).
68. Prior to Gertz, the Court addressed the status of the individual because that indi-
vidual's status influenced the degree to which the event was a matter of public interest. As
Justice Brennan noted in his dissent in Gertz, "while public interest in events may at times be
influenced by the notoriety of the individuals involved, 'the public's primary interest is in the
quiry focuses on whether the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of
defamation by entering a public controversy. The result is a first
amendment privilege that does not protect press reports of activities
commonly thought to be covered by that amendment. 9 For example,
the news stories in Wolston v. Readers Digest, Inc.70 and Hutchinson
v. Proxmire71 both concerned reports of interest to the public about
the government's activities in, respectively, combating espionage, and
spending taxpayer's money on government contracts. In each case,
the Court asked not whether reporting about these events or the
plaintiff's involvement therein was in the public interest, but whether
each plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of defamation by entering
a public controversy in order to influence its resolution.
The subject of espionage in the United States is, quite arguably,
of significant public interest and discussion of such a matter ought to
be protected by the first amendment. Yet, in the Wolston opinion,
there is an extraordinary footnote suggesting that there is no public
controversy about espionage because virtually the entire populace be-
lieves it to be wrong.72 In other words, Wolston suggests that if there
is no debate, there is no controversy, and if there is no controversy,
there is no need for first amendment protection. 73 Thus, even a mat-
ter of great public interest may not be a "public controversy" as the
Court has defined it. Consequently, the "public controversy" require-
ment has been effectively divorced from the first amendment.
News stories that clearly relate to the core values of the first
amendment are left unprotected by the current test. For example, in
Lawrence v. Moss, 74 the plaintiff was a paid political consultant to
candidate Orrin G. Hatch, now a United States Senator. Prior to
working on Hatch's campaign, plaintiff served on Vice-President Ag-
new's staff, held an official position with the Committee for the Re-
election of the President (CREEP), worked for the General Services
Administration and the Department of Commerce, and raised funds
event.'" 403 U.S. at 362 (citing Rosenbloom).
69. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1980); Law-
rence v. Moss, 639 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1981); Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir.
1981).
70. 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
71. 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
72. 443 U.S. at 166, n.8. Contra Marcone v. Penthouse Intern. Magazine for men, 754
F.2d 1072, 1083, n.8 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting Wolston).
73. The focus on debates and controversies has wrought a change in the type of evi-
dence that must be presented at trial or on motion for summary judgment. Prior to Gertz, and
even Rosenbloom, news clippings showing the extent of public interest in a certain matter were
a primary form of evidence. At present, however, such news clippings must evidence a pre-
existing debate. Indeed, evidence must also be presented, through testimony of the plaintiff
and other witnesses, that a public controversy and, more specifically, a split in public opinion,
existed before the defendant published its story.
74. 639 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1981).
for conservative political causes. The Hatch campaign retained the
plaintiff to assist in "political polling, strategy, voter targeting, vol-
unteer organization, advertising, writing, fund raising, and general
campaign management. 75 Although the facts suggest that plaintiff's
involvement in a United States Senate election campaign would con-
stitute a matter of public controversy, the Tenth Circuit disagreed.
The Court held that the plaintiff was not a public figure because his
"activities were in the background and concerned with administra-
tive organization . . . . [H]e made no speeches and no radio and
television appearances and did not write for public consumption.17 6
In other words, had the plaintiff given the speeches instead of writ-
ing them, the press would have enjoyed a first amendment privilege
to report on his activities. That this distinction should make a differ-
ence to citizens interested in the upcoming election defies
explanation.
77
In Arctic Co. v. London Times Mirror,7 8 a company employed
by the county water authority to conduct an archeological survey of
an area at the center of a local rezoning and development contro-
versy was held by the Fourth Circuit not to be a public figure or
public official. Despite the company's key role in providing data upon
which governmental decisions would, at least partly, be based, the
court found the company "did not 'press itself' into the public con-
troversy" since it "merely performed a narrowly-defined professional
service. '
79
Notably, the courts readily concluded that Johnny Carson and
Carol Burnett were public figures: Burnett, for being a "well-known
actress, a comedienne and show-business personality"'80 and Carson,
for being "an entertainer ...in the television industry," who has
"enjoyed an excellent name and reputation both internationally and
throughout the United States as being one of the more popular and
75. Id. at 636.
76. Id. at 637.
77. See also Littlefield v. Fort Dodge Messenger, 614 F.2d 581, 584 (8th Cir. 1980)
(Plaintiff attorney did not become a "limited purpose" public figure by practicing law in viola-
tion of his criminal probation, despite the fact that he thereby "voluntarily" engaged in an
activity that "was of great public interest." According to the court, Plaintiff's voluntary action
was not undertaken "out of a desire to influence any public controversy" and, in any event,
"the public's interest should not be considered in making the public figure-private individual
determination." See also Jenoff v. Hearst Corp., 644 F.2d 1004 (4th Cir. 1981) (A police
informant was not a public figure in connection with an article that charged him with breaking
into a defense attorney's office and stealing documents because "whatever attention Jenoff's
activities may have invited, . . .he never sought thereby to influence the resolution of any
public issue.".
78. 624 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1980).
79. Id. at 521.
80. Burnett v. National Enquirer, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 3d 991, 997, 193 Cal. Rptr. 206,
208 (1983).
outstanding practitioners of his profession.18 1 The courts are of the
same opinion with respect to prominent sports figures.8 2 Thus, mere
gossip concerning the private lives of famous citizens receives full
protection under existing law, a result that has attracted the disgust
of Chief Justice Burger, who stated in Greenmoss, that "too much
checking on the facts has ruined many a good news story."8 3
Such results illustrate the extent to which the public figure-pri-
vate person dichotomy has departed from the public interest con-
cerns that first supported it. The doctrine has become over-inclusive,
by protecting stories on the private lives of entertainment personali-
ties, as well as underinclusive, by failing to protect the dissemination
of information essential to American self-governance. Rosenbloom,
in attempting to safeguard the public interest, may have exceeded
rational boundaries, thereby sacrificing private reputational interests.
In order to balance the competing interests at stake, the existing
public-private person dichotomy should be modified.
IV. A Proposed Solution: Apply the First Amendment Only When
Necessary, and Return all Remaining Cases to the Dictates of the
Common Law
How can public interest concerns underlying the first amend-
ment be given their proper due without granting the press the right,
carte blanche, to ignore all private reputational interests? Con-
versely, how can the New York Times doctrine retain its vitality as
the attitude of the Court changes? The answer is found in the ra-
tionale originally articulated in the New York Times case: the first
amendment serves to maintain "the opportunity for free political dis-
cussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of
the people."84 In short, since the "core purpose"85 of the first amend-
ment relates to self-governance,86 the New York Times privilege
should too.
The New York Times privilege should be applied to stories that
are relevant to public affairs or the operation of the government, i.e.,
stories that facilitate public discussion on matters important to the
81. Carson v. Allied News Company, 529 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1976).
82. See, e.g., Cepeda v. Coweles Magazines and Broadcasting, Inc., 392 F.2d 417 (9th
Cir. 1968); Barry v. Time, Inc., 584 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
83. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2948 (1985) (Bur-
ger, C.J., concurring).
84. 376 U.S. at 269.
85. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575 (1980) (plurality opinion).
86. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245;
see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964) ("speech concerning public affairs
... is the essence of self-government"); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273
(1964) (the right to criticize the government is "the central meaning of the First
Amendment").
governance of the nation. Its purpose should be to protect the func-
tion of "the citizen-critic of government."87 The privilege should be
story or content oriented, rather than people oriented. If a private
individual is involved in a matter related to a governmental function,
he or she would be subject to the privilege. Conversely, the privilege
would not apply to stories about the purely private lives of entertain-
ers such as Carol Burnett or Johnny Carson. Of course, the public or
private status of an individual will frequently affect the determina-
tion of whether the privilege applies. For example, a report of a pri-
vate individual's divorce and financial crisis would not be privileged.
However, if the very same story is written to prove a candidate's
unfitness for public office, it would be related to the candidate's par-
ticipation in government88 and would, therefore, be subject to the
privilege. However, the focus would remain on the story and whether
it "relates to public affairs or government," not on the status of the
individual.
News stories and other publications that are irrelevant to the
political process would be subject to the prevailing common law.
These include matters of undoubted "social importance" such as
literature and the arts. 89 While comment about such important soci-
etal matters will not have the benefit of a constitutional, albeit condi-
tional, privilege, such comment is not left unprotected. The common
law privilege of fair comment remains available and is likely to en-
compass most of what is said or written in the form of literary or
artistic criticism, but not mere gossip.
The determination of whether particular publications are rele-
vant to the political process will undoubtedly, like the present public
figure - private person dichotomy, require some difficult line draw-
ing. But, as one commentator has stated, "as long as the values of
reputation and free expression both command our respect, judges
will have to draw lines somewhere." 90 Moreover, the "relevance to
the political process" standard has three distinct advantages. First, it
is significantly more meaningful in its relation to the first amend-
ment than the present public figure - private person distinction. Sec-
ond, it would be both easier to apply and more properly limited in
scope than the "public or general interest" approach adopted in Ro-
senbloom and subsequently abandoned as over-inclusive. Last, it has
intellectual validity. It forces the courts to ask the proper question;
specifically, is the public's right to know the particular information
87. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282.
88. Meiklejohn, supra note 86 at 259.
89. Meiklejohn, supra note 86 at 262.
90. Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Cen-
tral Meaning of the First Amendment", 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 624.
of greater value than the individual's right to an unsullied reputa-
tion? In core areas, where information is essential for the purpose of
conducting and maintaining our democracy, the answer must be yes.
Thus, the publications involved in the Greenmoss Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone91 decisions would fall outside the privilege (both involved mat-
ters unrelated to government), while those in Wolston and Proxmire
would be fully protected (the reputational interests of the plaintiffs
were incidental to stories related to critical governmental issues -
espionage and government contracting).
This approach will reconnect the post-Gertz law of defamation
with its constitutional roots. The constitutional privilege will focus,
once again, on the "central meaning of the first amendment," and
the sovereignty of the people, rather than on the name recognition of
the plaintiff. A return to the constitutional values which motivated
New York Times is essential if the law of defamation is to bear rela-
tion to the core function of the first amendment, and is to be pre-
served as the Supreme Court evolves.
91. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 407 (1976) (report of society couple's divorce
trial).

